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Theoristscontend that privatesocial groups-particularly those that have no overt political missions
such as bowling leagues, sports clubs, and choral societies-make majorcontributionsto democracy
by generatingengagementwith democracyin the form of political interestandparticipation.Although
this discussion is generallyat an aggregatelevel, it is based on seldom-testedassumptionsabout individual-level phenomena.This study expands our understandingof how (and where) membershipsin
various groups are associated with political engagementof individualcitizens. We test if the effects
of group membershipvary across eleven Europeandemocraciesand test which types of groups have
the strongestassociation with political engagement.We find that major social groups differ in their
relationshipwith engagement,and we also find that formal political arrangementsfor group accommodationmay condition the effects of some membershipson engagement.

The work of RobertPutnamhas done much to reestablishthe relevanceof voluntarysocial groups and the potentialrole that these groups play in maintaining
democraticpractices (Putnam 1993, 1995; see also Norris 1996; Verba,Schlozman, and Brady 1995). The nub of this argumentis well known: private civic
associations-particularly those that have no overt political missions such as
bowling leagues, sportsclubs, and choirs-make majorcontributionsto the building of politically relevanthumanand social capital (see also Almond and Verba
1963; Barber1995, 281; Pateman1970). Kim (2000) refersto this groupof scholars as the neo-Tocquevillians.
Although social capital has often been discussed in terms of aggregate-level
indicators,there are, or at least should be, clear individual-levelimplicationsof
the phenomena.Yet, as Hooghe (1999) notes, there is surprisinglylittle empirical work on the individual-leveleffects of civic associations given how important they are held to be in the social science literature.Although we have
individual-levelmodels of people's interest in and engagement with politics, if
THEJOURNALOF POLITICS,
Vol.65, No. 4, November2003, Pp. 1111-1129
? 2003 SouthernPoliticalScience Association

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:05:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1112

Shaun Bowler,ToddDonovan, and RobertHanneman

group membershipis importantthen these models are underspecifiedin important ways. By the same token, if a focus on group membershipand engagement
with democratic politics ignores individual-level motivations for interest and
activity then these models, too, may be underspecifiedand overstatethe impact
of group membership.One notable exception to a compartmentalizedapproach
is that of Verba,Schlozman,and Brady (1995) who model political engagement
in the United States as being driven by group membership,most importantly
membershipin churchgroups.As with the work by Putnam,this raises the question of how much we can generalize beyond the case of America. Specifically,
does a model of political engagementthat takes account of the effects of group
membership"work"outside the United States, or are thereamendmentsthat need
to be made? If the model is general and it does work across severalnations, does
it hold for all groups?
In this article we answerthese questionsby modelling political engagementin
11 Europeannations as a function of both individual-levelattributes,including
membershipin groups, and national-levelcontext. We do so using a hierarchical
linear modelling (HLM) approach.Importantly,this approachallows us to take
account of cross-nationaldifferences in the ways in which some groups are formally incorporatedinto the political system.

SocialCapital,and PoliticalEngagement
Participation,
Argumentsabout the effects of social capital on democracyoverlapwith contemporarytheoriesof participatorydemocracythat stress citizens are not isolated
beings. Social organizationsthus play an important"educative"role in teaching
people how to tolerateeach other,how to interactand work together,and how to
act socially as well as politically. Such participationalso provides them with a
greatersense of efficacy and trust(Mansbridge1980, 236; Pateman1970, 42-46)
and may make individualsmore public spirited(Warren1992, 8).
Coleman (1990, 302) advances similarpropositionsusing the rubricof social
capital-a macrolevelresourcethat enhancesa polity's ability to act collectively.
Putnam, in particular,stresses the importance of individual-level, nonpolitical
participationas a means for providing the social capital that a nation needs to
maintainhealthydemocraticpractices.ForPutnam(1993), participationin soccer
clubs and choral groups, or, in the case of the United States, bowling as part of
a league rather than solitary bowling, generates face-to-face interactions that
build networksand trust,and over time, humancapital.By joining social groups,
citizens learn democraticnorms and thus establish the basis for effective democraticpractices. Social capital may also be built at the nationallevel as citizens'
networksof relations expand via participationin social groups.
One of the most thoroughmicroanalysesof the impactof social groupsis found
in the civic voluntarismmodel of Verba,Schlozman,and Brady (1995). In addition to noting the impactof individual-levelattributessuch as education,income,
and socialization processes, Verbaet al. also highlight the importanceof group
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and, in particular,churchmembership:"Runninga rummage sale to benefit the
church day care center or editing a church newsletterprovides opportunitiesfor
the development of skills relevant to politics even though the enterprise is
expressly non-political"(Verba,Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 383).
Centralto the debatesaboutthe importanceof voluntarymembershipin social
groups is the causal propositionthatmembershipproducesdemocraticvirtues of
the kind noted above. However,althoughattemptshave been made to refine the
theories into clear causal statements, they have not yet been tested very thoroughly, especially within Europe (Hooghe 1999; Newton 1997). Extant studies
that do attemptto advancecausal propositionsabout determinantsand effects of
social capital typically focus on individual nations (for the United States, see
Brehm and Rahn 1997; for Belgium, see Hooghe 1999; for Great Britain, see
Moyser and Parry 1997; in contrast, see Booth and Richard 1998 on Central
America).This researchclearly advancesour understandingof the effects of voluntaryassociations,yet most existing studies do not assess how these effects vary
across types of groups and across established democracies that have different
methods of incorporatingcitizens into the political system.
In addition, the question remains open as to whether some groups are better
than othersas incubatorsof democraticvirtues or whetherall groups are equally
good in thatregard.Putnamnotes thatTocquevillewrotethat"serious,futile, very
general and very limited, immensely large and very minute"organizationsalike
would instil the habits of public spiritedness(1993, 90). Seemingly quite different groups, such as bowling leagues and choirs, are often lumpedtogetheras the
kinds of associations that generatepolitical engagement.The expectationseems
to be that any group is just as good as any other, but this may not be the case.
Some groups may be better at encouraging engagement than others. Labor
unions, humanrights organizations(Amnesty International),and environmental
groups (Greenpeace),for example, have an obvious political dimension. It is not
so obvious that sports groups (membership in a soccer club) or arts groups
(choirs) have such a dimension.

Variation
in GroupEffectsand Variation
in Institutional
Context
The question of whetherthere is likely to be variationin the impact of group
membershipis, typically,left unstatedin this literature;howeverrecentwork has
began to identify that groups differ in their internaldiversity and in the solidarity they may breed. Stolle and Rochon observed differenteffects of group membershipon trustand optimism in three nations,and cautionedthat "a generalized
enthusiasmfor the effects of associationmembershipmustbe temperedby a specification of what types of groups we are talking about"(1998, 57).
As Table 1 illustrates,there is substantialvariationacross Europeannations in
the propensityfor citizens to join voluntaryassociationsand in the types thatthey
join. The firstcolumn lists the percentagewho reportedmembershipin an at least
one voluntarysocial group in 1990. Some of the groups (such as charities,arts,
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TABLE1

in 12 EuropeanNations
Voluntary
GroupMembership
Percentageof populationwho are members of:

Nation
Netherlands
Denmark
GreatBritain
Ireland
Belgium
W. Germany
France
Italy
Spain
Portugal
Greece

% mentioningany
group (omitting
parties and unions)

sports
group/club

churchbased group

arts group/club

71.0
70.5
54.6
52.3
51.0
49.2
38.5
31.6
23.2
22.6
15.9

35.2
34.8
23.8
25.6
21.9
27.9
16.1
10.2
8.3
11.5
6.5

26.9
20.9
19.4
17.5
8.9
15.9
6.2
8.8
5.9
5.6
1.8

10.7
10.3
6.8
3.8
14.0
4.9
6.3
6.5
3.3
4.6
5.6

Note: Cell entries are percentages of respondentsclaiming membership.The first column omits
membershipin political parties and labor unions, and includes church groups, arts groups, human
rights groups, ecology groups, youth groups, consumer organizations,sports groups, and "other"
social groups.
Source: Eurobarometer34.0, November 1990.

and sports groups) have far less overt political content than others (such as consumer groups or humanrights groups).According to these 1990 Eurobarometer
#34 data, the most common voluntary,nonpolitical groups that citizens join are
sportsgroups.After sportsclubs, unions, and churchgroups, the next most commonly cited membershipwas in arts groups. When membershipsin unions and
political parties are omitted,as with the data listed in Table 1, in most nations at
least half of all voluntarygroup membershipcan be attributedto nonpolitical
associations such as sports and arts groups, with much of the remainingbalance
being membershipin churchgroups.
We test if membershipsin variousgroups differ in their association with political engagement.These groups are not alike in how they bring people together,
and not all social theorists are sanguine about the effects that certain voluntary
social groups might have on democracy.Indeed, Kim (2000) illustratesthat the
groups Putnamidentifiedas beneficial bred,for Max Weber,a passivity inimical
to democracy.Sports clubs, in particular,constitute a category that likely captures a broad range of possible social interactions.Media images of European
soccer fans do little to offer encouragementfor the hypothesis that membership
in such groups is associated with civic virtues. Even sports groups that require
more active participation(i.e., playing sports versus simply watching or being a
booster) may have questionableeffects on civicness, since one of the primary
social interactionsthat the group experiences is competition. In their study of
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voluntaryassociations in Germany,Sweden, and the U.S.A., Stolle and Rochon
(1998) include sports clubs in the same category as hobby groups and car clubs,
since these groups are organized aroundprivate, personal interests that are not
expectedto generateas much intragroupor intergrouptrustand solidarityas other
forms of association.
By contrast,one of the next largestcategoriesof nonpolitical,voluntarygroup
membershipin Europe is arts clubs. As with sports groups, this category captures a wide rangeof variationin types of groups, includingtheatregroups, quilting bees, music performance groups, literary societies, choral groups, dance
groups, folk art groups, and the like. There are also reasons to expect that participation in arts groups in particularwould be associated with greaterpolitical
engagementthan sports clubs. Advocates of the arts claim that art plays a fundamental role in democratic societies by integrating minority ideas into the
culture(Arian 1989; Blandy and Congdon 1987, 76). The arts also generatefaceto-face contacts that might bridge cultural divides, while exposing people to a
wider varietyof experiencesand ideas (Boyer 1987). Most importantly,much art
that is not the least bit avant-garderequiresa substantialdegree of group effort
and coordinationbuilt upon individualsacrificeand consensus (Arian 1989, 111).
The productof interactionsin arts groups is often public and, relative to sports
groups, noncompetitive.
Another way in which the neo-Tocquevillianargumentis incomplete is that it
can be read as saying that a fluid, informalrelationshipbetween voluntaryassociation and civil society is either the only or the best way of promoting democratic engagement. National-level political context, however, may play a role.
Tarrow (1996) specifically criticizes Putnam for failing to recognize that the
Italianstate itself may have stimulatedhigh levels of associationalactivity.Other
scholarshave faultedPutnamfor failing to considerhow a nation'spolitical "rules
of the game" shape civil society. Foley and Edwards(1996) stress the contextual
effect of political repression on civil society in El Salvador,while Booth and
Richard(1998) demonstratethatregime repressionin CentralAmerica depressed
individual-leveltrust, democraticnorms, and political participation.Indeed, as
Table 1 illustrates,nations with the most recent history of political repression
(Portugaland Greece) have the lowest levels of reportedgroup membership.
If levels of political engagement are tied to skills learned by the society as a
whole via group activity,then these nations may have less of a base for creating
engaged citizens. Although people residing in longer-lived democracies like
Great Britain may have some very general sense of how to engage in politics,
such learning may not be as well establishedin Portugalor Greece. Given this,
we need to account for national-leveleffects on political engagementassociated
with whether a respondentlives in a newer (e.g., Portugal)or an older democracy (e.g., England).'Overlappingthe length of a nation'sdemocraticexperience
'Older democraciesincludeBelgium, Denmark,France,GreatBritain,andThe Netherlands.Newer
democraciesinclude Greece and Portugal.The referencecategory includes Ireland,Italy,and Spain.
See also note 8.
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is the overall wealth of a country.At the individuallevel we may expect to see
wealthier people more actively engaged with democraticpolitics, because they
may have the economic interests, time, or resources to do so. Analogously,we
might expect to see that wealthiernations provide a social context that facilitates
higher levels of political engagement.
Othercross-nationaldifferencesmay also shape the impact of group membership. Studiesof the consensus democraciesarguethat formalpolitical institutions
incorporatepeople into politics and may build civic virtue from the "top down"
(Anderson and Guillory 1997; Lijphart1999). They stress that formal political
incorporationvia consensualpolitics generatesparticipationand also satisfaction
with democracy. In some nations political incorporationof groups is statesanctionedand formalizedto the point of hierarchical,corporatistarrangements.
In others, social groups compete for influence in a more informal, pluralistic
arena.The terms "corporatism"and "pluralism"are not only markersfor distinct
versions of democracy,but they also provide quite differentexamples of associationalrelationsthat affect how some group memberships,most notably in labor
unions, are shaped by formal political institutions.We suggest that membership
in some voluntarynonpoliticalgroups in a corporatistnation might not be as relevant in facilitating political engagement, if only for the fact that the nation's
formal political institutionsmight play a largerrole in doing this.
Similarly,the individual-levelimpactof church-groupmembershipand specifically of denominationnoted by Verba,Schlozman, and Brady (1995) may well
vary by the nation'sreligious context.Europeanstatesare distinctfromthe United
Statesin often havingdominantreligions:broadlyspeaking,Catholicin the south,
Protestantin the north. In some cases this dominanceis reflectedin the statusof
being a state church.As with groups in corporatiststates, membershipin church
groups in Europemay involve ties to the wider political structure.Moreover,if
membershipin Protestantchurchesin Europeis associatedwith greaterlevels of
voluntaryactivity,as in America (Verba,Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 320-25),
then models estimatingpolitical engagementas a functionof group activity need
to control for nationalreligious context.
European democracies thus provide interesting cases in which to see if
national-levelcontext shapes and conditions the impact of group memberships.
With the models specified below, we can test how national-leveland individuallevel variablesaffect political engagement.

Hypotheses,Data,and Measures
We assess the following questions:do voluntaryorganizationsengendercivic
virtues, and if they do, what sort of groups are best for generating them? As
Newton (1997) and Hooghe (1999) point out, these questionshave not been welltested empirically,and any statisticaltests will ultimatelybe unable to establish
exactly what the directionof the relationshipmay be. Still, testing the theorywith
availablecross-sectionaldata advances our understandingof the role that group
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membershiphas in democratic societies. Data for our analyses are taken from
Eurobarometer34.0, conductedin November of 1990. This survey not only provides responses to appropriatequestions of political engagement and participation, but also asks respondentsabouttheiractivities in social groups.This survey
thus provides a reasonabledata set from which to assess the questions at hand
across a wide range of national settings.2
Responses to four questions were combined to create a single index reflecting
an individual'sengagement with democraticpolitics. We combine measures of
how frequentlythe respondentdiscusses politics with friends, whether an individual tries to convince others of their views, how interestedthe individualis in
politics, and whetherthe individualis a memberof a political party.3TableAl in
the online appendix presents a fuller description of the index. Each of these
measures-taken individually-is unlikely to capture all aspects of political
engagement.As an index, however,they do tap into a relatively broad range of
participatorybehaviorandpolitical engagement.If membershipin informal,nonpolitical groups has an effect on engagement,we would see a significantassociation between group membershipand this measure in models that control for
other individual-leveland national-levelforces operatingon engagement.4
The key independentvariablesof interestare groupmemberships.Information
aboutnine differentkinds of groupmembershipis availablein this survey,including church groups, unions, and other groups."Some of our measures of volun2Listwise deletion of cases with missing scores resulted in final samples of about 1,000 observations in each of 11 nations (see TableA2 in the online appendixfor descriptivestatistics on the distributionof the dependentvariablein each nation). The original data set includes adequatesamples
for 12 nations.Norwayis excludedhere because some attitudinalmeasuresare lacking for thatnation.
3To measure attempts at convincing others (ICPSR study 9576, V69), respondentswere asked
"whenyou hold a strongopinion,do you ever findyourselfpersuadingyour friends,relativesor fellow
workersto shareyour views? Does this happen:often [coded 3], from time to time [2], rarely,never
[1]?" For frequency of discussion (V70), "when you get together with friends, would you say you
discuss political mattersfrequently[2], occasionally [1], or never [0]?" For interest(V75), they were
asked, "to what extent would you say you are interestedin politics? A great deal, [3] To some extent
[2], Not much [1], Not at all [0]?"For membershipin a party (V61) see wordingin footnote 5 below.
Each item is standardizedand weighted equally in our index which is the sum of these four terms.
The resulting Cronbach'salpha is .61. See TableAl in the online appendix for more details about
reliability and covariationamong items in the index.
4 We also estimatedmodels taking each of these measuresas a separatedependentvariable.Results
are displayed in the online appendix. Use of this index also makes the presentationof our results
much more parsimonious. Tables A4a-A4d of the online appendix provide models estimating
responses to each of the 44 items, in each of the 11 nations (i.e., 44 separatemodels). In addition
these tables also include estimates using the pooled sample from all nations to estimate logistic and
ordered logistic regression models of individualitems in the index. Results from these estimations
do not challenge the substantiveresults presentedin this article.
5Respondentswere asked "which, if any, of the following groups or associations do you belong
to?" They were shown a card listing the following, and multiple responses were permitted:charities,
religious or churchgroups,cultural/artsgroups,tradeunion or professionalassociation,humanrights
organizations,nature conservation/ecologygroups, youth groups, consumer groups, sports club or
associations, or "otherspecific groups."See ICPSR study 9576 variables57-66.
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tary social group membershipin particular-those associated with membership
in arts, charity,church, sports, and youth groups-are of special interest since
these are not as obviously "political" as most of the other types of groups
measured here. We test the hypothesis that membership in voluntary groups
has a positive association with political engagement even after we control for
individual-level factors associated with engagement. Further,the social capital
literatureleads us to expect this hypothesis will hold across all types of groups,
for both obviously "political" groups (human rights groups, environmental
groups) as well as the not so obviously political informalgroups identifiedby the
Tocquevilliansas being important(arts and sports clubs in particular).
Although a strictreadingof the social capital literatureleads us to expect this
hypothesisto hold across differentnations,we anticipatethat the effects of group
membershipmight be greaterin pluralistic states since formal incorporationof
interests may mute the independenteffects of group membershipin corporatist
nations. We test for this possibility by including terms that representthe effects
of interactionsbetween an individual'smembershipin a group, and her nation's
level of interestgroup pluralism(IGP).6
Demographicand attitudinalfactors at the individual-levelalso affect political
involvement and engagement, and must, therefore, be controlled for in our
models. Measuresof educationalattainment,gender,income, class, age, nonrural
residence, religion, and perceptionsof financialwell-being (duringthe last year)
are all includedas controlvariablesin the models. Categoricalmeasuresof these
allow us to see any nonlineareffects associated with these variables.Religion is
coded with three dummyvariablesfor Catholics,Protestants,and otherreligions,
respectively.The reference category for religion is those who did not categorize
themselves in terms of any particularfaith. Forage, the referencegroup is 45-54,
the high point of civic engagementover the life-cycle, and for income the reference group are those who replied "don'tknow or refused to answer."'The reference group for perceptionsof finances are those who felt their situationshad not
changed over the last year, and the reference category for education are those
with the lowest levels. Working-classindividuals are representedby a dummy
variablereflecting self-identification.Our general assumptionsare that the independent effects of nonruralresidence, higher education, higher income, being
nonworkingclass, being Protestant,and perceiving that personal finances have
improved,will each be associated with higher levels of engagement.
Our estimates also account for whetherthe respondentwas on the winning or
losing side in the last national legislative election in their nation, since those
backing losing parties can be more likely to be disengaged from politics (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Listhaug 1998). Respondents counted as being on the
6See Lijphart(1999, 171-84) for extended discussion of this measure and its correlationwith a
"consensus"model of democracy.Higherscores reflectmore pluralism,low scores more corporatism.
7Interpretationof this reference is less intuitivethan the others, but it allows us to retain respondents who refuse to disclose their incomes.
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losing side are those who did not vote for the parties that formed government
after the recent election. We also control for the relative extremityof one's political views: an individual who self-identifies as either quite left-wing or quite
right-wing is likely to be more engaged in politics than someone who does not
see herself in such terms.We representthis by folding the standardleft/rightselfplacementscale into a single measurereflectingself-placementat eitherextreme.
Further,those with the most ideological views who supportpartiesthat are out
of power may well be even more engaged with politics, since they may be relatively more politically sophisticatedwhile also having grievances with the political order.We capture this with a term interactingour measure of ideological
extremitywith the measureof having been a recent "loser"in the electoralarena.
In additionwe includeda measureof post-materialismand the standardleft-right
conservativismscale from which the extremism score was constructed.We also
include a count of the total numberof groups to which an individualbelongs as
anothercontrol. By including all of these factors affectingpolitical engagement,
we can be more confidentthat any correlationwe observe between group membership and engagementis nonspurious.
The discussion above highlights national-level factors that could affect a
citizen's engagement, if not condition the effects of various individual-level
factors. Interestgroup pluralism(vs. corporatism)in each nation is measuredby
Lijphart'sindex (Lijphart1999, 177). This measurerangesfrom high and positive
for pluralistcases to nearerzero for the more corporatistcases. Othernationallevel variablesin the models representolder andnewerEuropeandemocraciesand
a measureof each nations'per capitaincome.sWe expect that individualsin newer
and poorerdemocracieswill see generallylower levels of political engagementas
a consequenceof living in societies with fewer democraticresources.
We also included a variable representingeach nation's religious context by
includinga measureof the percentageof the overallpopulationwho are Catholic.
Extendingthe finding of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) from individuals
to the nationallevel, we expect to see predominantlyCatholic states exhibit generally lower levels of political engagement. Alternatively,where Catholics are
closer to majorityor pluralitystatus in a nation, religious homogeneitymay lead
some Catholics to be more engaged with politics. We include interactions
between an individual'sreligion and her nation'sreligious context (measuredas
percent Catholic) to test for this.9 Finally,we control for the effect of high religious attendancefor Protestantsand Catholics, respectively.
8 The age of democracycategorymeasuresthe aggregatedemocraticexperiencethat citizens might
have in each of these nations at the time of the 1990 Eurobarometersurvey. Old democracies are
defined as those having age cohorts who may have experienceddemocraticelections prior to WWII.
These includeBelgium, Denmark,France,GreatBritain,The Netherlands,andWestGermany.Newer,
post-WWIIdemocraciesinclude Greece and Portugal.Ourresultsdo not change when Spainis moved
from the referencecategory to the new democracycategory.
9Table A3 in the online appendix displays correlations among the national-level variables used
here.
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ModelSpecification
Ourhypothesescombine to model political engagementas a functionof factors
at two different levels of analysis: the individual and the national. The main
hypotheses concern the individual-leveleffects of group membershipafter controlling for other individual-levelattributesand national-levelcontextualeffects
on individuals.One way to address the effects of national attributesis by using
hierarchicallinearmodelling, or HLM, a modelling techniquedesigned to isolate
such contextual,cross-system differences(Bryk and Raudenbush1992). HLM is
used to generatesimultaneousestimatesof the individual-levelequation'sparameters while allowing national differences in both slopes and intercepts.1o
One way of thinking about HLM is that, in order to obtain estimates of the
impact of second-level (national) effects on individuals (in this instance the
impact of interestgroup pluralism,age of democracy,GNP per capita, and percentage Catholic), we perform a regression estimation at the individuallevel of
a model along the lines of Equation(1).
Yij = floj + flj memberunion organizationij+ 12j membersportsgroupij

+ 33jmemberchurchgroupij+ 34jmembercharityij
+ ps, memberartsgroupij+ 06j genderij
+ "67jcollege education + --- + rij

(1)

HereY is the dependentvariablefor individuals(i) expressedas deviationfrom
the mean of each country (j), and it is modelled as a function of membershipin
groups plus some otherattributes(here genderand education);r is the errorterm
that expresses residual variation of individuals' scores from the mean of their
nation and becomes especially relevant in calculating measures of fit. In HLM
we can go furtherand model both intercepts(3oj) and slopes (1fj) as nation specific. The coefficients of the "randomcoefficients"regressionmodel (3ojandPri)
in Equation (1) serve as the dependent variables in simultaneous group-level
regression estimates. So, for example, we might think that there are significant
differencesbetween nations accordingto both the degree of formal group membership (IGP, the corporatist-pluralist continuum) and the position of the
Catholic church,e.g.,
o0j= Yq0 +

qllGPj

+ Yq2 %Catholiclj + uqj

(2)

Equation(2) models differences in the interceptin Equation(1) as a function
of nationallevel variables,here a nation'sIGP score and the share of the overall
populationwho are Catholic.We can also model second-level (here national)differences in the size of the parametersin Equation(1). In which case we might
see the parameterassociatedwith, say, membershipin a laborunion amplifiedby
the role of unions in a more pluralistcountry,e.g.,
1lj

= Yg'qj
+
YqlGPij +

(3)

uq

10Calculationswere performedusing HLM 5 (Raudenbushet al. 2000).
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The right-hand side variables in Equations (2) and (3) are "second-level"
effects measured at the national level while u is the error term for the second
level (and,as with "r"from Equation(1) becomes importantin calculatinggoodness of fit measuresbelow) . Equation(2) allows the adjustedmean of the individual-level dependentvariableto differ from one nationto anotherand for these
differences to be modelled. Equation(3) allows the effects of independentvariables on dependentvariables at the individual level (e.g., the effect of being a
member of an arts group on the dependentvariable)to differ from one nation to
anotherand for these differencesto be modelled.
In the results that are reportedin Table2, two models are estimated.Model 1
contains only effects of national-levelcovariateson means (that is, there are no
covariatesas in Equation 3), whereas Model 2 is specified such that effects of
covariateson the slopes of independentvariablesare included. Although HLM
models are relativelycomplex in thatthey operateat two levels of analysis simultaneously,the interpretationof regression coefficients is very much the same as
in any otherlinearregression.That is, coefficients express effects of unit changes
(or group differences from a reference category in the case of dummy independent variables)on outcomes (either means or slopes).
Using the impact of pluralism(as measuredwith the nation'sIGP score) as an
example, one questionof interestis notjust whetherthereare differencesin political engagementbetweenpluralistand nonpluraliststates (i.e., a version of Equation 2) but also to see whether, for example, the impact of particulartypes of
group membershipvary across nations (a version of Equation3). And so, conceptually,we can take the parameterassociated with the impact of group membershipon individualpolitical engagement(Equation1) and see if the size of this
parametervaries across pluralistand nonpluraliststates (Equation3). The flexibility of HLM means that we can do this for a numberof second-level effectsincluding age of democracy,religious context, and aggregatelevels of wealth-at
the same time, in orderto look for interceptshifts.
HLM cannotdemonstratecausality,but it providesa morerigoroustest of association than standardregression models. Although we cannot sort out selection
effects with this approach,a key hypothesishere is that,aftercontrollingfor both
individual-leveleffects and also cross-nationaleffects, we should see a positive
correlationbetweenpolitical engagementand membershipin nonpoliticalgroups
if the neo-Toquevillianthesis can be generalizedacross all nations and all types
of groups.

Results
Table2 presentsresults of HLM estimatesof our models for the primaryvariables of interest.These estimates were generatedwith models that also included
additionalcontrolvariables.Coefficients for the additionalattitudinaland demographiccontrolsare listed in Table2A at the end of this article.The two left-most
columns in Table 2 and Table 2A are estimates of equations of the type (1) and
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TABLE2

LinearModelsEstimating
Hierarchical
CivicEngagemen
Model 1: Effects on Means
Level of Effect
Individual
ContextualMeasures
InterestGroup Pluralism
Old Democracy
New Democracy
GNP
Pct. Catholic
Intercept
Groupmemberships
Sports group memb
Churchgroup memb
Nature/Env.group memb
Arts group memb
Consumergroup memb
Charitygroup memb
Humanrights group memb
Union member
Numb. of grp. membships

Coeff

.024
.111
.486
.432
.527
.686
.820
.854
.129

s.e.

Model 2

National

Indiv

Coeff

s.e.

-.114
-.425
-1.138
-.035
-.017
-.001

.056
.114
.202
.018
.001
.104

.154
.199
.211
.176
.221
.201
.276
.177
.130
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Coeff

s.e.

.073
.104
.509
.433
.532
.685
.827
.859
.130

.118
.202
.214
.180
.246
.202
.387
.168
.132

Post-Materialism
Materialist
Mixed
Post-Materialist
Religion
Catholic
Protestant
Otherreligion
No religion
Hi Relig. attnd* Prot.
Hi Relig. attnd*Cath.
Numberof Cases
Fit
Individuallevel
National level
U (nationallevel residual)
R (individuallevel residual)

-

1.044
.427

.179
.096

1.042
.425

.179
.096

-.351
-.826
.299

.124
.278
.212

-.32
-.80
-.283

.126
.265
.205

.843
.561

.769
.833
-.657
.564
10,629

-

-.783
-.612
10,629

Base-line Model

Model 1

Model 1 % reduction
over baseline

91.6%
8.4%
.63
6.81

.11
5.069

83
25

* The first set of interactionsare R's
*
group membership national-levelIGP,the second are R's religion * perce
Note: Parametersin bold are significantat .05 level or better.A dash in place of the coefficient denotes the va
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(2), while columns 3, 4, and 5 reportestimatesthat includes the kinds of effects
representedin Equation(3) above.
There are two sets of coefficients to discuss associatedwith Model 1 and three
sets to discuss associated with Model 2. Model 1 produces coefficients representing individual-leveland national-leveleffects on individuals,while Model 2
produces coefficients that reflect individual-level effects, national-level effects,
and the effects of cross-level interactions. By and large most kinds of group
membershipare associated with higher levels of political engagement.The two
notable and consistent exceptions to this are sports and youth groups."
This is an interestingfinding since these are the groups identifiedin the neoTocquevillianliteratureas neededto promotepolitical engagement.The null association between sports groups and engagementcan be seen in both of the HLM
models in Table 2, and in nation-specific logistic regression estimations where
each item from our engagement measure was used as separatedependentvariables (these estimates are available in the online appendix,TableA4). Although
it seems clear that most membershipsare associatedwith increasedengagement,
not all groups are equally important.Groups that might be seen as overlapping
with the political arena (environmentalgroups, consumer groups, unions, and
human rights groups) are all associated with higher engagement. Of the groups
that are of greaterinterestto neo-Tocquevillians-the relativelynonpoliticalvoluntary groups--charities and arts groups have much strongerassociations with
political engagementthan churchand sports groups.12
This patternof group membershipeffects standsup, even after accountingfor
national-levelcontextualeffects. The second column of Table2 shows the results
for the national-leveleffects as estimatedvia Model 1. Here we see several patterns of note. The first is that level of interest-grouppluralismwith a countryour measureof the lack of formal,corporatistgroupincorporation-has no direct
impacton an individual'soveralllevel of political engagement.The national-level
effect of Catholicism mirrors the individual-level findings reported by Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady (1995), even after controlling for wealth effects both at
the individual-level and nationally. Respondents from nations with more
Catholics have lower levels of engagement. Finally, individuals from countries
that had little experience with democratic elections until after WWII-nations
where democraticresourcesare likely to be sparse-had the lowest levels of polit" Use of the numberof
group membershipsas a variableintroduceslinear dependenceas it is the
sum of all group memberships.This requiresthat one of the group membershipmeasures must be
omitted-we omit youth groups. When it is included without the measure of total group memberships, it is not significant.
12Any specificationwe used producedweak resultsfor the effects of sportsgroups on civic engagement, relative to the effects of other groups. As the online appendix illustrates,there is some evidence that membership in sports groups is associated with one element of our civic engagement
measure(interest:for Denmark,France,and Ireland).In no nation is sports-groupmembershipassociated with more than one item from our dependentvariable.Moreover,the effect of membershipin
sports groups is associated with significantlyless engagement in some estimations.
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ical engagement.Contraryto expectations,respondentsfrom the older democracies had lower levels of engagementthan those in "middle-aged"democracies.13
There are also other significant individual-level effects on political engagement, in additionto the effects of membershipin groups. Recall that we do not
assume that effects of all individual-levelvariablesare likely to be linear.Hence,
we break down education into several differentcategoricalvariablesmeasuring,
for example, medium- and high-levels of education.Even though there are positive effects for a moderateeducationlevel, the effects for higher education(university-level graduateor universitystudent)are greaterwith a parameterroughly
twice as large (the HLM estimates of Table 2 and Table 2A can be compared
directly as in OLS).
A similar effort to capturepossible nonlinearityis seen in our estimation of
the effects of age, income, and perceptionsof personalfinances. Of these, age in
particulardisplays nonlinearitiessuggestive of a life-cycle effect-people in the
youngest and oldest age categories are significantly less engaged with politics
thanthose in the referencegroup (45-54). Otherdemographicvariablesare associated with greaterengagement.The independenteffects of being male, an urban
resident, nonreligious (the reference category for the individual-level religion
variables),perceiving personal finances as most improved,and being in the top
income bracket,areeach associatedwith higherscores on our measureof engagement. We also find that citizens with relatively extreme ideological orientations
are more engaged with politics, while people who rate themselves as relatively
more conservativeare less engaged.
Model 2 (Columns 3, 4, and 5) displays the individual-leveleffects of group
membershipestimatedas functionsof national-levelvariables.Model 2 builds on
the results of Model 1 in two ways. In Model 2 we examine if formal corporatist
arrangementsat the societal level amplify or mute the impactof individualmembership in voluntary organizations.Similarly,this model tests if the impact of
religious affiliationis shaped by the wider religious environment:membersof a
church could, for example, behave differently when their denominationis in a
minoritywithin a society than when it is in a majority.
We can see in column 3 that the individual-leveleffects of group membership
hold up when we account for cross-level interactiveeffects associated with pluralism and the nation's religious context. Results in column 5 (the group*IGP
interactiveeffects) demonstratethatpluralism-or the lack of corporatism-conditions how membershipin some groups is associated with engagement.Pluralism is associated with higher levels of engagement among union members and
membersof environmentalgroups.That is, in nations that lack formalizedincorporationof groups, the effects of these membershipson political engagementare
even more pronounced.In general,however,the effects of involvementin groups
on an individual'sengagement with democraticpolitics is typically direct and

"3Again,see note 8. The referencecategory includes Ireland,Italy,and Spain.
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does not usually dependon the degree of pluralismor corporatismof the national

system.14
Second, the cross-level interactions between an individual's religion and
national religious context (Relig. * % Catholic) illustrate that Catholics have
lower levels of engagementregardlessof the percentageof Catholicsin a nation.
Contraryto our expectations, Protestantsare the least engaged-regardless of
whetherthey reside in a predominatelyCatholic nation or not.
The goodness-of-fit for models of this type is assessed by examiningthe residual variationat both the individual-level(that is, how much of the variationof
individualsfromtheirnation'smeans is not explained)and the national-level(that
is, how much of the variation in national means is not explained by compositional differences in the samples from different nations and the measured
national-leveldifferences).One of the virtuesof HLM is thatit helps to see where
the main varianceis to be explained-either at the individualor aggregated-level.
Table 2 lists a baseline model fit with none of the national-level measures
includedthathas a residualvarianceof 6.81 ( from r in Equation(1) above)within
nations and 0.63 between nations. This suggests that most of the variance is at
the individual ratherthan national level. Furthermoreby comparingthe reduction in varianceof the two models we can see the impactof the second-level variables. Model 1, the model with national covariate effects on means, but no
national effects on individual-levelparameters,accounts for 25% of the withinnation varianceand 83% of the between-nationvariance.Model 2 helps account
for slightly more (26%) of the within-nationvariance.Nonetheless, the modelling of national-leveleffects does show significant impacts on the way in which
political engagementtakes place with some (modest) evidence of an amplification of political engagement by the presence of formal group arrangementsin
society.

Conclusion:BowlingTogetherMightnot Matterso Muchas
SingingTogether
Our analysis has shown evidence consistent with the argumentof Putnamand
the neo-Tocquevillians.That is, we see individual-levelevidence that membership in some private, nonpolitical associations is associated with greaterpolitical engagement in Europe. This suggests that activity in such groups may
generate democratic virtues. The nature of the group membership matters,
however. Having said that, we ought to note that some of our findings are not
consistent with the Putnam/neo-Tocquevillianarguments.Of the relatively nonpolitical, noneconomic groups expected by neo-Toquevilliansto be breedinggroundsfor democraticvirtues (arts, charities,church,sports,and youth groups),
only artsand charitiesareassociatedwith political engagement.To a lesser extent,
14Although in other estimates-not reportedhere-it does have an impact on satisfaction with
democracy in a mannerentirely consistent with Anderson'sfindings (Anderson and Guillory 1997).
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national-level conditions may also affect how group membershipis associated
with engagement.
Of course, correlationcannot establish causation, but the lack of association
between membershipin some of these groups and political engagementleads us
to question how far we may generalize about the "educativerole" that all voluntary groups play in teaching democraticvirtues. If voluntarygroups play such a
role, it would seem that not all are the same in their ability to do so. In other

TABLE2A

HLMEstimatesof CivicEngagement,additionalcontrolsused in
modelsin Table2
Attitudinalmeasures
Conservative(scale)
Strong ideology
SupportedLosing Party
Str. ideology*Loser
Finances much better
Finances better
Finances same
Finances worse
Finances much worse
Demographics
Female
Married
Homeowner
Top income group
High income
Medium Income
Didn't reveal income
WorkingClass
High Education
Medium Education
Student
Low Education
Age 15-25
Age 25-34
Age 35-44
Age 45-54
Age 55-64
Age over 65
Town
City
Rural area

Model 2

Model 1
-.064
.283
-.060
.089
.590
.201

.025
.053
.127
.073
.195
.071

-.064
.283
-.058
.089
.588
.201

.026
.053
.127
.073
.196
.070

.213
.060

.106
.227

.213
.055

.107
.227

-.619
.126
.033
.422
.198
.074

.071
.072
.067
.142
.122
.107

-.618
.127
.031
.426
.202
.080

.071
.073
.067
.142
.123
.106

-

-

-

-

-

-.427
.827
.455
.854

-

-

.085
.107
.073
.171

-.427
.823
.454
.852

.085
.107
.073
.170

-.465
-.308
-.105

.160
.120
.096

-.466
-.307
-.105

.161
.120
.096

-.082
-.263
.021
.088

.106
.138
.082
.104

-.081
-.263
.020
.087

.107
.138
.081
.103

-

-

-

Note: Parametersin bold are significant at .05 level or better.A dash in place of a coefficient
denotes the variable'sreference category.
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words, choirs and theatreguilds may help pave the path to democraticvirtue, but
bowling leagues or football clubs may not. To the extent that this patternholds
up elsewhere this suggests the neo-Tocquevilliansmay have to develop more
nuanced argumentswith regardto the kinds of social groups that might instill
democraticvirtues.
While advancing our understandingof how groups may affect a citizen's
engagementwith democraticpolitics, this study also presentsavenuesfor further
researchin this area.Ourmeasuresof groupmembershipprovidesubstantialvariation across nations and types of groups, but they may mute the effects of some
activity and also blur differences across types of groups inside each category.
Futuresurveys with bettermeasuresof involvementin groups may betterclarify
how far neo-Tocquevillianargumentsmay be extended.This could include measures of time spent in activities associated with social groups. Researchcould be
advancedfurtherwith bettermeasures of various types of groups inside each of
the categories used in this study. It is quite possible, for example, that not all
sports groups are the same. Likewise, there might be substantialvariationin the
forms of group activity associated with what we categorize here as church or
youth-group membership. It is difficult to imagine a nonexperimentalsocial
science researchdesign that could provide the definitive test of causal relationships implicit in neo-Tocquevillianviews on the effects of social groups on democraticvirtues. Improvedsurveymeasures,however,could providefor additional
tests of the relationshipsthat we explored.
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